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In two experiments, we investigated how social comparative feedback affects the
metacognitive regulation of eyewitness memory reports. In Experiment 1, 87 participants
received negative, positive, or no feedback about a co-witness’s performance on a
task querying recall of a crime video. Participants then completed the task individually.
There were no significant differences between negative and positive feedback groups on
any measure. However, participants in both of these conditions volunteered more fine-
grain details than participants in the control condition. In Experiment 2, 90 participants
answered questions about a crime video. Participants in the experimental groups
received either positive or negative feedback, which compared their performance to
that of others. Participants then completed a subsequent recall task, for which they
were told their performance would not be scored. Feedback did not significantly affect
participants’ confidence, accuracy, or the level of detail they reported in comparison to a
no feedback control group. These findings advance our understanding of the boundary
conditions for social feedback effects on meta-memory.
Keywords: memory, meta-memory, social comparison, eyewitness memory, feedback
INTRODUCTION
Our memory for experienced events is the result of a reconstructive process that can be influenced
by social factors (Bartlett, 1932). The presence of others can affect peoples’ confidence in their
memory, and discussion of an event between two or more individuals can cause their accounts
to converge (Wright et al., 2000, 2009; Shaw et al., 2007; Gabbert et al., 2012). These findings
accord with the theory of social comparison, which posits that in the absence of objective means
for assessing our opinions and abilities, we do so by comparing them to those of others (Festinger,
1954). When recalling events for which the ground truth cannot be determined, we may compare
our memory to that of others who have experienced the same event in an attempt to produce
an accurate account (Bless et al., 2001). Accuracy and informativeness of recall is monitored
by metacognitive assessments, through which rememberers determine which details to report
or withhold (Ackerman and Goldsmith, 2008). In two experiments, we examined how receiving
social comparative feedback (i.e., information about others’ memory reports—or how our memory
compares to that of others) affects the metacognitive processes that underlie memory reporting.
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Memory reporting is governed by metacognitive processes,
which allow individuals to monitor and control the information
they volunteer (Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996). According to
Ackerman and Goldsmith’s (2008) revised dual-criterion model,
accuracy and informativeness are independent metacognitive
criteria that individuals seek to satisfy when choosing which
details to include in a memory report. Cutoffs for confidence
in the accuracy of responses and their informativeness are
personally established, and as such, vary from person to person.
The precision of a response is adjusted/decreased (fine-to
coarse-grain) until it meets these criteria, otherwise it is withheld.
Coarse-grain information is less precise, and therefore more
likely to be accurate than fine-grain information. For example,
reporting that a perpetrator’s shirt is navy blue means that
if the shirt were in fact forest green, the reported detail is
erroneous. However, reporting that a perpetrator’s shirt is ‘dark’
encompasses a range of colors—the response is less detailed
(no one color is specified) but less likely to be inaccurate.
In a series of studies, the authors gave participants varying
degrees of control over the grain size of their responses
to general knowledge questions. Results showed that when
possible, participants adjusted the grain size of their responses
to satisfy both accuracy and informativeness criteria. However,
when participants were unable to satisfy both criteria, they
were likely to violate the accuracy criterion to offer an
informative, but less reliable answer. Given the option to
withhold responses, participants did so in situations where
desired levels of accuracy and informativeness could not be
achieved through regulation of grain size. The experimental
paradigm used by Ackerman and Goldsmith (2008; and
previously by Goldsmith et al., 2002, 2005) offers an excellent
means for examining metacognitive monitoring and decision-
making regarding memory reporting. The theoretical model
examines the role of confidence in the regulatory process,
whereas the applied eyewitness literature has tended to focus on
the role of confidence in diagnosing the accuracy of responses
(Roberts and Higham, 2002; Vredeveldt and Sauer, 2015; Sauer
and Hope, 2016).
Weber and Brewer (2008) applied Goldsmith et al.’s (2002)
version of the model to examine the role of confidence in
the strategic regulation of eyewitness memory. In two studies,
they found that the level of detail provided by participants
was strongly, positively correlated with their confidence in
the accuracy of their fine-grain responses. Additionally, when
participants were allowed to choose whether to report or
withhold responses, they withheld information that failed to
meet an implicitly established confidence criterion. In line
with findings from previous research, these results indicate
that confidence in the accuracy of fine-grain details recalled is
a primary determinant of what participants choose to report
(Goldsmith et al., 2002). Extending this work, Evans and
Fisher (2011) found that metacognitive monitoring and control
processes allow individuals to maintain the accuracy of their
memory reports over time. They tested participants’ memory for
a crime event immediately, and after a 1-week delay. Participants
were more likely to provide coarse-grain responses to questions,
or refrain from responding altogether after the delay. Such
responding decreased the level of detail participants provided, but
helped maintain the accuracy of their reports.
Metacognitive monitoring and control processes
demonstrably aid individuals in balancing the competing
demands for informative, but accurate memory reports.
However, the efficacy of these processes has only been examined
in relation to recall that occurs in experimental settings free of
potential social influence. Yet, remembering often occurs in the
presence of others, and research demonstrates that various forms
of social influence can affect memory performance. For example,
Betz et al. (1996) asked participants to read a story and complete
a recognition task. During the recognition task, participants
were exposed to bogus tallies representing how many of six
other participants selected each of the response options. On a
subsequent cued recall task, participants were more likely to
provide answers selected by the implied majority, especially
for less-memorable, non-distinctive items. Underscoring the
persuasiveness of this information source, the effect persisted
even when participants were instructed to ignore the answers
provided by others. These findings demonstrate one type of
social influence effect—that of conformity—on memory.
Bless et al. (2001) explored the boundary conditions of social
comparison effects on memory processes and found that low
confidence in one’s own memory appears to increase the tendency
to engage in social comparison. When participants were not
confident that their lack of recall for a stimulus indicated its
absence from a previously studied list, they tended to rely on
others to determine whether or not the stimulus had indeed been
presented. This susceptibility to social influence was dependent
on conditions such as exposure time and the salience of stimuli.
Sub-optimal encoding of details therefore seems to increase the
influence of social factors on subsequent recall. Even perceptions
of encoding quality can increase rememberers’ susceptibility to
social influence (Gabbert et al., 2007). Gabbert et al. (2007)
told participants that they had viewed a set of pictures either
for half as long, or twice as long as a co-witness. In actuality,
participants had viewed a slightly different set of pictures than
their co-witness, but for the same amount of time. The participant
and the co-witness then discussed the pictures before providing a
free recall report. Participants who believed they had viewed the
material for a shorter duration were more likely to incorporate
incorrect information mentioned by the co-witness into their
own accounts.
Gabbert et al.’s (2007) findings extend those of previous
studies of social influence factors affecting recall and memory
reporting in the eyewitness memory literature. Co-witnesses to
a crime frequently discuss the event with each other, and this
has been found to influence their subsequent reports (Paterson
and Kemp, 2006; Skagerberg and Wright, 2008; Wright et al.,
2009). Social information provided by authorities in the form
of feedback can also affect witnesses’ confidence in their recall,
and their judgments regarding the quality of the witnessing
experience (goodness of view, duration of encoding time, etc.;
Wells and Bradfield, 1998; Dixon and Memon, 2005; Leippe et al.,
2006). The present research is concerned specifically with social
feedback effects on recall (but for a meta-analysis of feedback
effects on recognition see Douglass and Steblay, 2006).
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The existing literature provides some guidance regarding
the effects of feedback on the accuracy of individuals’ memory
reports, and their reported confidence. Roper and Shewan
(2002) tested participants’ recall before and after labeling them
as ‘good’ or ‘poor’ eyewitnesses. These labels were randomly
assigned, and did not reflect participants’ genuine performance.
Providing participants with positive feedback (‘good’ label)
improved their recall performance on a second assessment.
Participants who received negative feedback (‘poor label’) were
more likely to comply with leading questions. In another
study, participants viewed a video of a staged robbery and
made a forced-choice identification of the perpetrator from
a target-absent line-up (i.e., all identifications were incorrect).
The experimenters then informed half of the participants that
they were ‘good eyewitnesses,’ who had correctly identified the
perpetrator, and the other half of participants that they were ‘poor
eyewitnesses,’ who had made an incorrect identification (Dixon
and Memon, 2005). After receiving this feedback verbally and in
writing, participants were asked to provide details of the crime
and perpetrator. Participants who received negative feedback
expressed decreased confidence in the accuracy of their recall, yet
this decrease in confidence did not affect the quantity or accuracy
of information provided. The authors concluded that feedback
concerning recall exerts an effect on eyewitness’ confidence in
their memory.
While the feedback provided in Roper and Shewan (2002) and
Dixon and Memon (2005) was self-relevant (in that participants
were given a direct evaluation of their own performance) and
categorical, feedback of a comparative nature can also affect
individuals’ confidence in their memory and their subsequent
memory reports. Leippe et al. (2006) gave participants either
negative or positive feedback regarding the accuracy of their
memory reports – relative to a co-witness – for a videotaped
theft. Participants who received positive comparative feedback
later made faster identifications with increased accuracy, and
reported a higher level of confidence in the accuracy of their recall
than participants who had received no feedback. Despite being
associated with decreased confidence, negative feedback did not
slow down or render participants’ reports less accurate. The
authors concluded that participants’ belief in the accuracy of their
memory was affected by the social comparative feedback. Positive
feedback boosted belief in memory accuracy, while negative
feedback lowered it, as measured by confidence. Consistent with
other work, these changes in memory confidence were reflected
in participants’ retrospective reports of the witnessing experience
(Wells and Bradfield, 1998; Douglass and Steblay, 2006).
In sum, the results of research on how social feedback affects
eyewitness recall indicate that positive feedback can increase
individuals’ confidence in the accuracy of their reports, while
negative feedback can decrease confidence (Roper and Shewan,
2002; Dixon and Memon, 2005; Leippe et al., 2006). Confidence
assessments underlie metacognitive decision-making regarding
which details of a memory rememberers choose to report (Koriat
and Goldsmith, 1996). However, aside from effects on confidence,
research has yet to examine the effects of social comparative
feedback on metacognitive mechanisms underlying the selection
of information for reporting. The aim of the present research
was to investigate whether, in addition to accuracy and quantity
of information volunteered, social comparative feedback could
also affect the precision with which individuals choose to report
details from memory. Understanding how extraneous factors
such as social comparative information gleaned from a co-witness
or investigative interviewer affect the metacognitive processes
underlying memory reporting could lead to more theoretically
informed interviewing approaches, and a better appreciation of
eyewitness memory performance.
In two experiments, we examined the effect of receiving
social comparative feedback regarding a co-witness’ or one’s
own memory performance on participants’ subsequent memory
reports. We introduced a social manipulation (the provision
of social comparative feedback) with the expectation that it
would affect metacognitive monitoring and control processes,
and participants’ resulting memory reports. Experiment 1
investigated the influence of participants’ perception of the
accuracy and informativeness of a co-witness’ memory on the
confidence and level of detail they reported regarding a witnessed
event. Participants received either positive or negative feedback
about the quality of a co-witness’ report, before being asked to
answer questions about a videotaped crime. In Experiment 2,
participants watched a crime video and completed a “practice
task” that involved answering a set of questions about a character
from the video. Participants were then given self-relevant
feedback pertaining to their performance on the practice task,
before answering further questions about the crime. We expected
that giving participants negative or positive feedback about their
own memory performance would affect their confidence in the
accuracy of their memory, and therefore also affect the level of
detail, or grain size, of the information they chose to report.
In line with findings from other studies of social comparative
feedback effects on memory reporting, we did not expect the
accuracy of participants’ reports to be affected in either of the
two experiments (Dixon and Memon, 2005; Leippe et al., 2006).
The present experiments extend the existing literature on both
social influences and metacognitive processes affecting memory
by examining the two phenomena jointly.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Design
In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly
allocated into one of three conditions: high co-witness score
feedback, low co-witness score feedback, and control (no score
feedback). We manipulated exposure to the score of a co-witness
and examined the effect of that exposure on participants’ (a)
confidence in the accuracy of their recall for a crime video, (b)
actual recall accuracy, (c) volunteering of fine-grain and coarse-
grain details, and (d) withholding of responses to cued recall
questions.
Participants
Participants (N = 87) were university students or employees
(65 females; Age M = 27.5, SD = 12.4) who were recruited
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through the department of Psychology’s research pool and a
database of individuals who signed up to receive information
about research participation. Conditions for participation
included having normal or corrected-to-normal vision (as
assessed by self-report), and being over the age of 18 years.
Participants were given course credit for participating or were
paid a small honorarium. Ethical approval for the experiment was
obtained from the University’s Science Faculty Research Ethics
Committee.
Materials
Stimulus Event
The stimulus event was a 1-min video depicting a (simulated)
burglary. In the video, two young men cycle up to a house
and forcibly enter through a back door. Once inside, the
perpetrators steal a laptop and some money before making their
escape (Tehguns, 2011). Participants in the control condition
viewed the video individually, while those in the experimental
condition viewed the video in pairs. After viewing the video on
a computer screen, all participants completed a written filler task
(approximately 5 min), after which they completed the recall task.
Recall Task
The recall task consisted of 23 cued recall questions. The
questions related to details from the video (e.g., How old was
the perpetrator who broke into the house? What color was his
top? What color was the laptop the perpetrators stole? How many
drawers did they open?). Following Koriat and Goldsmith (1996)
and Weber and Brewer (2008), questions were presented in two
phases. In Phase I, participants provided a coarse- and a fine-
grain response to each question (forced report). For the purpose
of easily eliciting these types of answers, questions required either
numeric answers or referred to the color of an object in the video,
as in Weber and Brewer (2008). No specific guidance was given
regarding how ‘coarse’ numeric responses could be, participants
were simply asked to provide a range (e.g., 17–20 years old).
Fine-grain responses to questions with numeric answers were
restricted to specific whole numbers (e.g., 27 years old). Coarse-
grain responses to questions about the color of objects were
restricted to shades (dark, light, warm, and cool). Finally, fine-
grain responses to questions about the color of an object were
restricted to a specific color (e.g., red, white). Participants were
also asked to rate their level of confidence in the accuracy of
each of the fine- and coarse-grain answers they provided on a
scale of 0–100% (increasing confidence) in increments of 10%.
The order of the questions was randomized, and the order in
which participants were asked to enter fine-grain and coarse-
grain answers was counterbalanced.
In Phase II, participants were presented with the same
questions, along with the coarse- and fine-grain answers they
provided in Phase I (without their original confidence ratings)
as response alternatives. They were instructed to imagine that
they were making a statement to the police with regard to the
witnessed crime, and to select the response alternative (fine-
grain or coarse-grain) that they would give to investigators.
Participants were also explicitly told that they could withhold
responses (e.g., by answering ‘don’t know’) if they were unsure
of the correct answer. They were told to be as accurate as possible
without guessing.
Procedure
Prior to the start of Phase 1, participants in the experimental
groups saw either ‘high’ or ‘low’ feedback about the co-witness’
performance. This bogus feedback was presented in the form of
a test percentile that was prominently displayed in the center
of the computer screen, and supposedly referred to overall
accuracy of details volunteered by the co-witness at Phase II.
Participants in the high score feedback group saw a high accuracy
co-witness score (i.e., 93%). Conversely, participants in the low
score feedback group saw a low accuracy co-witness score (i.e.,
28%). We exposed participants to the score of an implied co-
witness to give them the impression that the co-witness had
performed either very well (high score feedback condition) or
poorly (low score feedback condition). In fact, the experimenter
fabricated all scores. The manipulation was incidental in nature;
that is, participants were not overtly instructed to take notice of
the score. Instead, after signing the informed consent, viewing
the video, and completing the filler task in separate rooms,
participants were led into another room by the experimenter.
The purpose of moving participants into another room was to
give them the impression that the co-witness had completed the
recall task in the second room while they had been working
on the filler task in the first room. After giving the participants
about 5–10 s to look at the computer screen, the experimenter
instructed the participant to click the ‘next’ button to begin
the recall task. We deliberately did not draw the attention of
participants in the co-witness condition to the apparent score of
their co-witness. Our aim was to replicate a situation in which
social feedback might be obtained indirectly in a natural way
(rather than more explicitly instructed for – which is a feature of
previous research). We also wished to avoid a situation in which
our social feedback manipulation might have been transparent
to participants – this would almost inevitably have been the case
with a direct instruction.
Participants in the experimental groups were asked if they
had noticed the co-witness’ score at the start of the experimental
session in a manipulation check at the end of the recall
task. Participants were also asked what they thought the
purpose of the experiment was. The complete procedure took
approximately 30 min. On completion, all participants were
thanked. Participants were debriefed once data collection was
completed.
Coding
The principal investigator (PI) and an independent rater
determined what constituted accurate answers to the 23 items
in the recall task. This was done by watching the video,
answering the questions individually, and then comparing
results. Disagreements were discussed, and more than one
correct answer accepted where individual answers could not
be reconciled (e.g., both blue and black for the color of
the perpetrators trainers). A fine-grain answer was considered
correct if it matched the answer to the question that was
agreed upon by the investigator and an independent rater.
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A coarse-grain answer was considered correct if it contained the
agreed upon answer (e.g., correct answer of three items stolen
from the house is contained in the coarse-grain answer range
of “2–5”). After accurate answers were determined, the PI and
rater separately coded the data for accuracy in a spreadsheet with
condition identifiers removed for all participants. Inter-coder
agreement was high, with a single intraclass correlation (ICC)
value of 0.90.
Results
Two participants were removed because their scores were outliers
(more than three standard deviations away from the mean) for
two or more of the dependent variables. A third participant’s
information was excluded due to failure to follow instructions
for completing the recall task. Data from the remaining 84
(control= 30; high score feedback= 27; low score feedback= 27)
participants was entered into the first analysis.
In line with previous research, preliminary analyses revealed
a positive correlation between confidence in fine-grain answers
at Phase I, and volunteering of fine-grain answers at Phase II,
r(82)= 0.49, p < 0.01. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
revealed that there was no effect of condition (receiving high,
low, or no social comparative feedback) on participants’ (a)
confidence in the accuracy of their fine-grain answers at Phase
I, F(2, 83) = 0.57, p = 0.57, ω = 0.10; (b) accuracy of both
fine and coarse-grain responses at Phase I, F(2, 83) = 0.30,
p = 0.74, ω = 0.14; (c) volunteering of fine-grain responses, F(2,
83) = 2.12, p = 0.13, ω = 0.16 and (d) withholding responses at
Phase II, F(2, 83)= 1.12, p= 0.33, ω= 0.05.
A manipulation check revealed that 15 of the 54 participants
in the two experimental groups did not notice the manipulation
(co-witness score). These 15 cases were excluded from the second
analysis, which left a total of 69 participants (control = 30;
high score feedback = 19; low score feedback = 20). To check
whether participants in the experimental group who had not
noticed the manipulation were biasing the results, we examined
group means, standard deviations and confidence intervals
for all dependent variables after these cases were removed
(see Table 1).
High and Low score feedback group means were very similar
for all dependent variables, but differed from means for the
control group. To test whether this difference was statistically
significant, we collapsed data from the high and low score
feedback groups and ran independent samples t-tests. Feedback
group (experimental n = 39; control n = 30) was entered as
the independent variable, with confidence, accuracy, withholding
of responses and fine-grain volunteering as dependent variables.
Results revealed a main effect of experimental condition on the
volunteering of fine-grain responses at Phase II. On average,
participants who had viewed a co-witness’ score prior to starting
the recall task volunteered a higher proportion of fine-grain
answers at Phase II (M = 0.45, SD = 0.13) than participants in
the control condition (M = 0.37, SD= 0.13). This difference was
significant, t(67) = −2.33, p = 0.023 and represented a medium
sized effect, d = 0.57. There were no significant differences
between group means for any of the other dependent variables
(see Table 2). The significant positive correlation between
confidence in fine-grain answers at Phase I and volunteering of
fine-grain answers at Phase II was slightly reduced in this smaller
sample, r(67)= 0.40, p < 0.01.
Discussion
Experiment 1 examined the effects of receiving social
comparative feedback about the quality of a co-witness’
recall for a jointly encoded event on participants’ metacognitive
monitoring and control strategies in a subsequent memory
report. Participants’ confidence in the fine-grain (detailed)
responses they provided at Phase I, as well as their likelihood
of volunteering these responses at Phase II, were examined in
relation to the type of feedback given. We expected that giving
participants negative or positive feedback about a co-witness’
memory performance would influence their confidence in the
accuracy of their own memory. While descriptive statistics
did reveal higher mean fine-grain confidence ratings for the
experimental groups (high and low score feedback) than
the control group (no score), this group difference was not
significant. It is possible that feedback may not have significantly
affected confidence because it was not self-relevant—unlike
the feedback participants were provided in Dixon and Memon
(2005), Leippe et al. (2006), which was. Despite there being no
significant difference between group with respect to confidence,
participants who saw either a high or low co-witness score
(cf. viewing no feedback information) before completing the
recall task volunteered significantly more detailed (fine-grain)
responses Phase II. In line with findings from the literature on
metacognitive regulation and reporting in memory, participants’
volunteering of fine-grain answers at Phase II was positively
TABLE 1 | Experiment 1: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables by condition after removal of data from experimental participants who did not notice the
manipulation.
Control (n = 30) Low score feedback (n = 19) High score feedback (n = 20)
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI
Fine-grain confidencea 62.7 (13.4) [57.7; 67.7] 66.4 (9.7) [61.9; 71.0] 67.7 (8.0) [63.9; 71.5]
Fine-grain volunteeringb 0.37 (0.13) [0.33; 0.42] 0.46 (0.13) [0.39; 0.51] 0.44 (0.14) [0.37; 0.51]
Responses withheldc 0.20 (0.14) [0.14; 0.25] 0.15 (0.11) [0.10; 0.20] 0.15 (0.12) [0.09; 0.21]
Overall accuracyd 0.68 (0.12) [0.64; 0.73] 0.68 (0.10) [0.64; 0.72] 0.71 (0.10) [0.66; 0.76]
aConfidence in fine-grain answers at Phase I (0–100%). bProportion of fine-grain answers volunteered at Phase II. cProportion of responses withheld at Phase II.
dProportion of accurate of fine and coarse-grain responses volunteered at Phase I.
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correlated with confidence in the accuracy of these answers at
Phase I across conditions (see Goldsmith et al., 2002; Weber and
Brewer, 2008).
An awareness of assessment and potential for comparison
may have increased participants’ motivation to provide detailed
answers. If participants saw the co-witness score and anticipated
that the accuracy of their own performance would be scored,
one might expect that they would select more coarse-grain
responses at Phase II. An emphasis on accuracy would be better
served by an increase in coarse-grain responses, which are of
a wider range margin and are therefore more likely to be
accurate. However, it may be that participants relate accuracy
to precision, and thus felt that selecting fine-grain responses
at Phase II would improve the overall quality of their report.
It is also possible that introducing a social element activated
communication norms, which increased participants’ emphasis
on informativeness (Grice, 1975; Yaniv and Foster, 1995, 1997;
Blank, 2009). As Ackerman and Goldsmith (2008) observed,
individuals strive to achieve criterion levels of informativeness,
at times violating their criterion for accuracy in order to do
so. Other researchers have found that participants avoid giving
coarse-grain responses, and that this may be particularly true in
social exchanges, where these responses are perceived as violating
implicit norms of communication (Yaniv and Foster, 1995, 1997;
McCallum et al., 2016).
The presence of another individual in the experimental
conditions may also explain the observed effect. According to the
drive theory of social facilitation (Zajonc and Sales, 1966), the
mere presence of others during task performance can increase
arousal, which leads to an increase in the frequency of the
dominant response in a given context. Goldsmith et al. (2002)
propose that the fine-grain answer is the default response, due to
its perceived informativeness. The presence of a co-witness may
therefore be responsible for the observed increase in participants’
volunteering of fine-grain responses.
Participants may also have been more likely to risk providing
detailed, but potentially incorrect answers due to the lack of
immediate performance-related consequences in a voluntary,
TABLE 2 | Experiment 1: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables by
condition after collapsing data from participants in the high and low score
feedback experimental groups.
Control (n = 30) Experimental (n = 39)
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI
Fine-grain confidencea 62.7 (13.4) [57.7; 67.7] 67.0 (8.8) [64.2; 70.0]
Fine-grain volunteeringb 0.37 (0.13) [0.33; 0.42] 0.45 (0.13) [0.40; 0.49]
Responses withheldc 0.20 (0.14) [0.14; 0.25] 0.15 (0.12) [0.11; 0.18]
Phase I CG accuracyd 0.73 (0.12) [0.68; 0.77] 0.75 (0.11) [0.72; 0.79]
Phase I FG accuracye 0.64 (0.15) [0.59; 0.70] 0.64 (0.10) [0.60; 0.67]
Overall accuracyf 0.68 (0.12) [0.64; 0.73] 0.70 (0.10) [0.66; 0.73]
aConfidence in fine-grain answers at Phase I (0–100%). bProportion of fine-
grain answers volunteered at Phase II. cProportion of responses withheld at
Phase II. dProportion of accurate coarse-grain responses volunteered at Phase
I. eProportion of accurate fine-grain responses volunteered at Phase I. fProportion
of accurate fine- and coarse-grain responses volunteered at Phase I.
lab-based study. Unlike recall tasks undertaken in a laboratory
setting, the accuracy and precision of information reported in
a real life investigative interview is of great consequence. There
were no drawbacks to volunteering more detailed but potentially
inaccurate information in the experiments presented here. In real
life, reporting detailed information that is likely to be inaccurate
can negatively impact a criminal investigation. Furthermore,
Yaniv and Foster (1997) proposed that metacognitive decision
making during memory reporting may be influenced by
differences in timing of payoffs for informativeness and accuracy.
Precision and informativeness are often immediately rewarded,
whilst overly coarse answers are not. The accuracy/inaccuracy
of answers becomes evident at a later time, and therefore
participants are encouraged to report a grain-size that increases
immediate gain. In this case, that gain might relate to a
perceived increase in informativeness—which individuals strive
for—through the provision of fine-grain details (Ackerman and
Goldsmith, 2008). To our knowledge, this is the first study to
assess the effect of social comparative feedback on the grain
size of participants’ responses. We therefore cannot compare
the increase in volunteering of fine-grain details observed here
with the results of other feedback studies we have reviewed.
Future studies should examine the effect of immediate and
delayed consequences/rewards for responding on the precision
of participants’ memory reports.
Consistent with previous work, the accuracy of participants’
memory reports in Experiment 1 was unaffected by the feedback
manipulation (e.g., Dixon and Memon, 2005; Leippe et al., 2006).
However, the findings from Experiment 1 do not replicate the
effects of feedback on confidence found in previous studies
(Dixon and Memon, 2005; Leippe et al., 2006). It is possible
that this is because the feedback provided was not directly self-
relevant, but pertained to the performance of the co-witness.
The increase in fine-grain responding by participants in the
experimental groups may have been motivated by a desire to
outperform the co-witness, or even the expectation of receiving
self-relevant social comparative feedback after completing the
recall task. The small effect size for the main finding may
have been due to the subtlety of the incidental manipulation;
14 participants in the experimental condition reported that
they did not notice it. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we sought
to increase the saliency of the social feedback manipulation.
Additionally, to control for the possibility that expectation
of feedback was leading to the observed increase in fine-
grain responding, participants in Experiment 2 were informed
(via onscreen instructions) that their performance on the cued
recall task would not be scored.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 investigated the potential effects of receiving
salient, self-relevant, social comparative feedback following a
practice recall task on metacognitive regulation and reporting for
a subsequent recall task. In this experiment, we sought to isolate
any potential effects of social comparison on metamemory from
the effects of expecting performance feedback by deliberately
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informing participants that their performance on the cued recall
task that followed the practice task would not be scored.
After viewing a video of a mock crime event, participants
completed a practice task comprised of questions pertaining
to one of the characters from the video. After the practice
task, participants were given bogus feedback in the form of a
percentile score comparing their performance to that of others
who had completed the task in terms of both accuracy and level
of detail. Thus, unlike Experiment 1, feedback in Experiment
2 was both direct (not incidental in nature) and self-relevant
(pertained to the participant’s own performance on a memory
task). Providing self-relevant feedback permits a more direct
comparison of results from Experiment 2 to those of other
studies exploring feedback effects on eyewitness memory reports
(e.g., Dixon and Memon, 2005; Leippe et al., 2006). Additionally,
to test whether the results of Experiment 1 were due to
participants’ expectation that their performance on the cued
recall task would be scored, we indicated in the instructions for
Experiment 2 that responses on the cued recall task would not
be scored. As such, we eliminated expectation of evaluation as a
potential confound. We were interested in whether or not telling
participants how their memory performance on the practice task
compared to that of others would influence their subsequent
metacognitive regulation strategy. The format of the cued recall
task in Experiment 2 was identical to that used in Experiment 1.
Based on findings from the literature on providing self-
relevant social comparative feedback to eyewitnesses (Roper and
Shewan, 2002; Dixon and Memon, 2005; Leippe et al., 2006),
we predicted that receiving negative feedback would lead to a
decrease in participants’ reported confidence in the accuracy of
their answers in Phase I, and a corresponding decrease in the
volunteering of fine-grain answers in Phase II of the recall task.
We also expected that receiving negative feedback would lead to
an increase in response withholding (a greater number of “I don’t
know” responses) at Phase II. We expected that receiving positive
feedback would have the opposite effect, resulting in increased
confidence and volunteering of fine-grain details, and decreased
withholding of responses. We did not expect the manipulation to
have an effect on the accuracy of participants’ memory reports.
Method
Design
In a between-subjects design, we manipulated feedback and
examined its effect on reported confidence (0–100%), selection
of grain size (coarse vs. fine), response withholding (number of
‘don’t know’ responses), and accuracy in a subsequent memory
assessment. Participants were randomly allocated to one of three
conditions; High score feedback, Low score feedback, or No
feedback/Control.
Participants
Ninety undergraduate students participated in this experiment.
The sample was comprised of 71 females and 19 males, between
the ages of 18 and 39 (Mage = 22.3; SD = 3.4). Participants
were recruited through the departmental research participation
pool and through advertising flyers posted in various university
buildings. They were either paid a small honorarium, or granted
course credit. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were the same as in
Experiment 1.
Materials
Stimulus Event
Participants viewed a 3-min video depicting a (simulated)
distraction theft. In the video, a man enters the home of an
elderly couple claiming to be a government employee who has
been sent to check their electricity meter. While he distracts them,
an accomplice enters the house and steals a few items from the
upstairs bedroom before leaving. The first perpetrator then steals
some money from the couple and leaves. In the final scene he
is shown getting into a car and driving off (westmerciapolicetv,
2011).
Procedure
After viewing the video, participants completed a computerized
“practice task.” This practice task was comprised of six questions
about the male victim in the video (e.g., How old is the male
victim?; What color is his shirt?). Participants provided coarse-
and fine-grain answers to each question, along with a rating
of their confidence in the accuracy of their answers on a scale
ranging from 0 to 100% (in 10% increments). At the end of the
practice task, experimental participants saw a screen with the
word “calculating. . .” displayed just beneath a download status
bar that quickly moved from empty to full. Once the download
bar was full, the screen displayed either a high (93%) or low (37%)
accuracy percentile rank supposedly reflecting the performance
of the participant on the practice task. Control participants
were not shown a download bar screen or provided with
feedback. Thus, in contrast to Experiment 1, in which participants
were exposed to feedback supposedly related to the recall
performance of a co-participant, in Experiment 2 participants
received self-relevant feedback about their own performance on
a practice task. This feedback was in fact false, and suggested to
participants that they had either performed very well (high score
feedback of 93% accuracy) or poorly (low score feedback of 37%
accuracy).
After the practice task, participants answered a further 22
questions about the video. They were informed that their
performance on the task would not be scored. The structure of
the phases in the cued recall task was the same as in Experiment 1.
In the manipulation check at the end of the task, participants
were asked what they thought the purpose of the experiment
was. Participants in the experimental groups were also asked if
they believed the score they were shown after the practice task
was representative of their performance, and if they thought it
had influenced their subsequent recall in any way. The entire
procedure took approximately 30 min. Afterward, participants
were thanked, and informed that they would receive a debrief
email about the purpose of the study once data collection was
complete.
Results
Manipulation Check and Data Screening
After screening the data, one case was removed due to a
technological error that resulted in most of the participant’s
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responses not being recorded. Two additional cases were
identified as outliers (more than three standard deviations
away from the mean on one or more of the dependent
variables) and removed. Data from a total of 87 participants
remained (34 in the high score feedback group, 30 in
the low score feedback group and 23 in the control
group).
Effect of Feedback on Confidence, Response
Volunteering, Response Precision, and Accuracy
We conducted a one-way ANOVA with type of feedback (control,
high, or low score feedback) as the independent variable and
participants’ confidence in the accuracy of their fine-grain
answers at Phase I, as well as the total number of fine-grain
responses volunteered and number of responses withheld at
Phase II as dependent variables. We found no significant group
differences for participants’ (a) confidence in the accuracy of their
fine-grain answers at Phase I, F(2, 86)= 0.71, p= 0.50, ω= 0.08,
(b) fine-grain volunteering, F(2, 86) = 1.51, p = 0.25, ω = 0.11
and (c) responses withholding at Phase II, F(2, 86) = 0.59,
p= 0.57, ω= 0.10.
In one of the items in the manipulation check, we asked
participants what they thought the purpose of the study was.
A total of 14 participants accurately guessed that the feedback
they received was part of the experimental manipulation and/or
expressed some suspicion as to its authenticity. The data
for these participants was removed for a second analysis.
Data from the remaining 73 participants (23 in the control,
26 in the low score, and 24 in the high score feedback
group) was entered into a second ANOVA with the same
independent and dependent variables. Again, results revealed
no significant group differences for participants’ (a) confidence
in the accuracy of their fine-grain answers at Phase I, F(2,
72) = 0.27, p = 0.77, ω = 0.14, (b) volunteering of fine-
grain responses, F(2, 72) = 0.73, p = 0.48, ω = 0.09, and (c)
withholding of responses at Phase II, F(2, 72) = 0.34, p = 0.71,
ω= 0.14. Table 3 displays group means, standard deviations and
confidence intervals for all dependent variables entered into this
analysis.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 are contrary to our hypotheses.
Participants in the control, high, and low score feedback groups
did not differ on any of our key measures. There are several
potential explanations for the lack of an effect of feedback on
responding.
The manipulation check questions indicated that while
most experimental participants were accepting of negative
feedback, many were suspicious of positive feedback. This is
not altogether surprising, as research has shown that some
people exhibit a stable tendency to distrust their memory, or
trait memory distrust (Van Bergen et al., 2009). One study
estimated that at least 10% of the population has a tendency
toward pessimistic evaluations of their memory capacity in
comparison to that of others (Crombag et al., 2000). All
participants who expressed suspicion about the authenticity
of the score in the manipulation check were eliminated
from the second analysis. However, it is possible that even
those participants who did not express suspicion/guess the
manipulation as reported in the manipulation check may not
have been entirely accepting of the feedback score they received,
which may have weakened the effect of the experimental
manipulation.
Another possibility is that participants’ performance on
the second set of questions was unaffected by feedback
because they were told that the second set of questions
would not be scored. This was a deliberate methodological
decision made during the design of the study to rule out
the possibility that expectations about evaluations would
lead to an increase in fine-grain responding. We wanted
to isolate the potential effects of the self-relevant social
comparative feedback provided for the practice task on
subsequent metacognitive regulation of memory reporting.
According to Feedback Intervention Theory, when individuals
receive negative feedback, they are likely to increase their
efforts to improve if given the opportunity on a subsequent
task (Kluger and DeNisi, 1996). If the feedback received is
positive, with room for improvement, performance efforts
may also increase (Kluger and DeNisi, 1996). Thus, in
the present experiment, (a) participants were not given
a second opportunity to assess their performance and
(b) those who received high score feedback were not
left with much room for improvement. In hindsight, the
feedback manipulation may have been ineffectual for these
reasons. This issue is discussed further in the General
Discussion.
Finally, in contrast to Experiment 1, all participants in
Experiment 2 viewed the stimulus video individually. In
TABLE 3 | Experiment 2: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables by condition after removal of data from experimental participants who guessed the manipulation.
Control (n = 23) Low score feedback (n = 26) High score feedback (n = 24)
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI
Fine-grain confidencea 62.8 (13.3) [57.1; 68.6] 65.2 (10.5) [61.0; 69.5] 63.6 (12.5) [58.3; 68.8]
Fine-grain volunteeringb 0.40 (0.11) [0.35; 0.44] 0.43 (0.11) [0.38; 0.47] 0.39 (0.14) [0.33; 0.45]
Responses withheldc 0.20 (0.13) [0.15; 0.26] 0.17 (0.16) [0.11; 0.24] 0.20 (0.14) [0.15; 0.26]
Overall accuracyd 0.65 (0.10) [0.61; 0.70] 0.68 (0.11) [0.63; 0.72] 0.68 (0.09) [0.64; 0.71]
aConfidence in fine-grain answers at Phase I (0–100%). bProportion of fine-grain answers volunteered at Phase II. cProportion of responses withheld at Phase II.
dProportion of accurate fine and coarse-grain responses volunteered at Phase I.
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Experiment 2, the presence of co-witnesses was merely
implied. If social facilitation underpinned the effect found
in Experiment 1, then failure to replicate in Experiment
2 would not be surprising. This highlights the need for
research on how the mere presence of others affects meta-
memory.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research investigated the effects of receiving social
comparative feedback regarding the recall performance of
a co-witness and oneself on participants’ subsequent recall.
In Experiment 1, receiving feedback of any level (high or
low score) regarding the performance of a co-witness on
a recall task increased the number of fine-grain (detailed)
responses reported by participants on a subsequent memory
assessment. In Experiment 2, receiving self-relevant feedback
on a practice memory task did not affect participants’
confidence in the accuracy of their recall, or the level
of detail they provided in a subsequent memory report.
While we expected that receiving self-relevant feedback
in Experiment 2 would replicate and increase the effect
observed in Experiment 1, this was not the case. Several of
the participants who received positive feedback expressed
doubts relating to the accuracy of this assessment of their
performance. Additionally, participants’ responses on the
cued recall task that followed the feedback may have
been unaltered because participants were told that their
performance would not be scored a second time. Thus,
participants may have had no motivation to increase the
level of detail they provided following the practice task.
In Experiment 1, seeing a co-witness’s score may have led
participants to believe that their own performance would
be scored, thereby increasing their motivation to provide
a detailed memory report. In Experiment 2, we informed
participants that their performance on the cued recall task
would not be scored because we predicted social influence
effects irrespective of evaluation concerns, but this was not the
case.
It is interesting to note that in Experiment 1, the experimental
groups did not express significantly higher confidence in
the accuracy of their fine-grain responses than the control
group. However, participants in the experimental groups did
volunteer significantly more fine-grain answers than the control
group. According to the revised dual-criterion model, fine-grain
responses are volunteered when confidence in the accuracy
of these responses is high (Ackerman and Goldsmith, 2008).
While there was a positive correlation between confidence
in the accuracy of fine-grain responses at Phase I and
fine-grain volunteering at Phase II, the magnitude of the
correlation was medium, suggesting that there were other
factors influencing participants’ decision to volunteer fine-grain
responses. Possible candidates for further investigation include
mere presence effects and increased motivation resulting from
expectation of feedback. Another interesting avenue for future
research would be to examine the effects of direct (socially)
encountered feedback on metacognitive monitoring and control
processes. While previous studies have successfully demonstrated
feedback and conformity effects via computerized delivery of
feedback and implied co-witnesses, effects may be stronger
with direct interaction (Betz et al., 1996; Kluger and DeNisi,
1996).
Finally, the sample sizes in both Experiments 1 and 2 were
reduced after manipulation checks, which may have limited the
power of our statistical analyses. We chose our original sample
sizes based on those used in similar studies. In Leippe et al. (2006)
the number of participants per condition was approximately
27 (experiment 1) and 21 (experiment 2) participants to a
cell. In developing and testing the revised dual criterion model
Ackerman and Goldsmith (2008) included 24 participants per
experiment. Similarly, Weber and Brewer (2008) included 31
(experiment 1) and 36 (experiment 2) participants. As such,
our sample size is in line with previous published research.
However, we ran a post hoc power analysis using Gpower, and
found that a sample of 159 participants is needed to detect
an effect size of 0.25 on confidence, with a power of 0.80.
This effect size was chosen based on effect sizes (etas) of
0.26 and 0.27 reported in Leippe et al. (2006) for significant
ANOVAs assessing the effect of social comparative feedback on
participants’ reported confidence in the accuracy of their recall.
In light of this finding, we recommend that future research
investigating social influences on metamemory include larger
sample sizes.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 do not provide a
definitive answer regarding the mechanisms that underlie the
observed effects of receiving social comparative information
on participants’ subsequent memory reports. However, they
do highlight the potential for social comparison to affect
the metacognitive appraisals that influence memory output.
These studies represent the first attempt to examine the
effects of social comparison in this area. Further work must
establish the most effective methodologies for investigating
the effects of social comparison, and aim to disentangle what
are likely to be complex relationships between the effects of
evaluation and social comparison. Future studies should also
investigate how the mere presence of a co-witness can affect
eyewitness’ confidence in the accuracy of their recall, and
the amount/degree of detail they choose to report, as well
as whether these effects are strengthened through face-to-face
interaction.
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